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The Labor-Relations Privilege: How




Peterson v. State is crucial to the molding of the labor-relations privilege,
both in Alaska and other jurisdictions because the case confronts a rarely litigated
issue and reaches an even rarer holding.2 The issue of labor-relations privilege
generally arises when an employee has a confidential conversation with a non-
attorney union representative assigned to his or her case and the employer at-
tempts to acquire knowledge of this confidential conversation.3 Through its hold-
ing, the Supreme Court of Alaska created an absolute labor-relations privilege that
extends to confidential communications between union representatives and em-
ployees participating in grievance procedures. 4 The holding rendered communica-
tions between union representatives and employees undiscoverable in subsequent
legal proceedings.5
Prior to the Peterson decision, an Alaska employer would have access to all
correspondence between a union employee and his or her union representative that
took place during the grievance proceedings.6 Once the grievance proceedings
failed and either the employer or employee appealed the decision rendered
through an alternative dispute resolution method, the employer could discover all
of these communications to use against the employee in the case on appeal. This
decision is important because universally recognized principles of justice indicate
that there is a presumption that all available facts should be divulged in court pro-
ceedings to facilitate effective decision-making.8 Therefore, new privileges are
rarely created.
In order to understand the precise effect the Peterson holding will have on la-
bor-relations law and privilege creation, it is important to first understand how
privileges have been created in the past, both traditionally and divergently. Next,
it is important to apply the historical context of privilege creation to understand
1. Peteron v. State, 280 P.3d 559 (Alaska 2012).
2. See id.
3. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Is a Full Labor Relations Evidentiary Privilege Developing?, 29
BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 221, 221 (2008).
4. See Peterson, 280 P.3d at 567.
5. See id.
6. See generally id at 561.
7. See id.
8. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
1
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the critical thinking that determines when and how a new privilege should apply.
Further, it is important to compare and contrast labor-relations privileges with
other privileges in order to create proper limits and application of the labor-
relations privilege. Applying this analytical framework to the facts, holding and
reasoning of the Peterson case will provide a more clear determination of the
effect of this case on labor-relations law and privilege creation.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2007, Russell Peterson, Jr. became employed with the Alaska Department
of Labor.9 At the commencement of Peterson's employment, he became a mem-
ber of the Alaska State Employees Association (ASEA) union. 0 In 2009, follow-
ing an investigation prompted by Peterson's request for service time credit,'' the
State discovered Peterson's 2007 job application failed to disclose a previous
felony.1 2 Consequently, the State terminated Peterson's employment.' 3 Peterson
responded by filing a grievance in compliance with ASEA's collective bargaining
agreement with the State.14 Peterson's grievance proceeding was represented by a
non-lawyer ASEA representative,' 5 who worked with Peterson's lawyer, Douglas
Mertz, to develop legal strategies.' 6 The ASEA representative and the State were
ultimately unable to come to a resolution concerning Peterson's grievance.' 7 Sub-
sequently, Peterson filed a wrongful termination lawsuit in the superior court.'8
The State subpoenaed the ASEA representative to appear for a deposition that
would grant the State access to Peterson's grievance file, including all written
communication between the ASEA and Mertz.19 Peterson filed a motion for a
protective order, claiming the file was protected by the attorney-client privilege.20
The superior court denied the motion, holding that Peterson waived his right to the
attomey-client privilege by giving the union access to his correspondence with
Mertz. 2' Further, the court found that there was no available privilege to protect
correspondence between a union member and a union. 22 After Peterson's motion
for a protective order was denied, he petitioned for review of the superior court's
order.23 The Supreme Court of Alaska granted the petition to address the follow-
9. Peterson, 280 P.3d at 560.
10. Id
11. See Payroll Procedures Manual, Section 14, available at
http://doa.alaska.gov/dof/manuals/ppm/resource/14_verification.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
Explains that rehired government employees can input the hours they worked in their prior government
position to be considered for retirement benefits.
12. Peterson, 280 P.3d at 561.
13. Id
14. Id.
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ing issues: (1) the applicability of any existing privileges; (2) The Supreme Court
of Alaska's authority, independent of rule-making authority, to judicially recog-
nize new privileges; (3) any related privileges used in other jurisdictions; and (4)
any related due process concerns that may arise.24
The Supreme Court of Alaska ultimately found that a union-relations privi-
lege existed through the implication of the Alaska Public Employment Relations
Act (PERA),25 and accordingly reversed the superior court's ruling and remanded
the case for application of the privilege to discovery proceedings. 26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Evidentiary privileges afford certain parties and potential witnesses protection
from forced disclosure of relevant and material evidence during the discovery
phase, as well as the actual trial. 27 Although union representatives owe acknowl-
edged fiduciary duties to the employees they represent and generally "evidentiary
privileges reflect a recognition of the duty of loyalty fiduciaries owe to their prin-
cipals," there is no universally recognized labor-relations privilege. 28 Each state
varies as to if and how it protects labor relations. 29 While many courts have ex-
tended privileges to include employer-employee relationships, state courts have
split views as to extending a privilege to third party strangers to the employment
relationship.30 Courts generally refuse to extend attorney-client privilege to non-
attorney union representatives, despite the fact that many collective bargaining
agreements require employees to commence a grievance process by working with
lay union representatives. 31 A full labor-relations privilege, which extends to
strangers outside the employment relationship, is vital for employees because
many labor disputes and affairs are frequently conducted by non-attorneys .32 Alt-
hough the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has extended privilege to
many non-lawyer representatives in labor arbitrations, courts have generally re-
fused to extend the attorney-client privilege to situations where employees sought
advice from lay union representatives. 33 The United States Supreme Court has not
addressed labor relations privileges directly,34 but the Court has "recognized that
uncertain privileges are not in the public interest."35
24. Id.
25. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.40.070 (West 2012). "The legislature finds that joint decision-making
is the modem way of administering government... The legislature further finds that the enactment of
positive legislation establishing guidelines for public employment relations is the best way to harness
and direct energies of public employees eager to have a voice in determining their conditions of work,
to provide a rational method for dealing with disputes and work stoppages, to strengthen the merit
principle where civil service is in effect, and to maintain a favorable political and social environment."
26. Peterson, 280 P.3d at 560.
27. Michael D. Moberly, Extending a Qualified Evidentiary Privilege to Confidential Communica-
tions Between Employees and Their Union Representatives, 5 NEv. L.J. 508, 508 (Winter 2004-05).
28. Id. at 510.
29. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 2.
30. Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 222.
31. Id. at 224-225.
32. See id. at 221.
33. Id. at 223-24
34. See id at 225.
35. Id. at 227.
No. 1] 199
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A. General Principles ofPrivilege Law
Privileges are unique from other rules of evidence because they exclude "reli-
able, relevant evidence in order to protect an interest deemed by a court or legisla-
ture to be more important than the interest served by admitting the evidence." 36
Privileges are controversial because they obstruct the placement of all relevant
legal evidence before the trier of fact, impeding a core function of the adversarial
process. 37 Although courts and tribunals traditionally disfavor evidentiary privi-
leges, 3 8 it has been generally held that certain private communications must re-
main confidential from court proceedings in order to serve certain societal inter-
ests, such as the stimulation of important professional and personal relationships. 39
Federal Rule of Evidence 50140 governs claims of privilege in federal courts and
provides the courts with flexibility to determine new privileges on a case-by-case
basis. 41 However, courts have found that Rule 501 has failed to provide federal
courts with "clear guidelines" in addressing "novel privilege claims."42 The Su-
preme Court has indicated that there is a presumption against recognizing new
privileges 43 and, thus, has taken a "cautionary approach" applying its power to
recognize new privileges under Rule 501."
Dean John Henry Wigmore, an expert in the field of evidence, 45 has con-
structed a highly influential framework for recognizing new common law privi-
leges.46 Wigmore's framework requires the existence of four fundamental condi-
tions prior to rendering communications as privileged:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must
be one, which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tion must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.47
36. Nissa M. Ricafort, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court's Dramatic Shif Supports the Recog-
nition ofa Federal Parent-Child Privilege, 32 IND. L. REV. 259,260 (1998).
37. Id.
38. See id at 286.
39. See Moberly, supra note 26, at 509.
40. FED. R. EVID. 501. PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL.
The common law--as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience--
governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:
* the United States Constitution;
* a federal statute; or
* rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding
a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.
41. Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 228-229.
42. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 264.
43. Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 229.
44. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 264-265.
45. See Donald F. Paine, Wigmore on Evidence, Tenn. B.J., September 2003, at 16. "[Wigmore's]
treatise is universally acclaimed for the depth of legal research and historical background."
46. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES, §3.2.3. CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZING NEW PRIVILEGES (Aspen Publishers, 2012).
47. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
200 [Vol. 2013
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Nearly all courts, including the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and state
courts, apply Wigmore's test as the "litmus test for determining the propriety of
recognizing a new privilege." 48 Under Wigmore's test, very little valuable evi-
dence is lost to privilege because any correspondence that would meet Wigmore's
criteria would only exist because both parties were fully aware of the existence of
a privilege and information was divulged knowing it would remain confidential.49
In response to concern that Wigmore's framework is unnecessarily strict, some
courts have developed a more humanistic interpretation of some of Wigmore's
essential principles in order to create more privileges than the initial framework
allows.so Under the humanistic model, the validity of a privilege rests on whether
the relationship between the parties is the type of relationship that requires one
party to consult the other party in order to make intelligent and independent life
choices.5 1 This rationale creates a possibility for privileges in medical and famili-
al relations, which are rejected under a pure Wigmorean analysis. 52
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of privilege in
a labor-relations case.5 3 In the past, the Supreme Court typically applied instru-
mental reasoning to the Wigmore framework and only found privilege in situa-
tions where information would not have been divulged in the absence of a known
privilege.54 In University ofPennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., the Supreme Court did not
create a privilege to protect peer review materials from disclosure in a Title VII
case against the University of Pennsylvania.5 5 In University of Pennsylvania, the
Court found that creating a privilege would interfere with the enforcement of Title
VII, which required an investigation into a charge of discrimination in order to
establish "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 56 Further, the Court
reasoned that in creating the procedure for Title VII cases, Congress was aware of
the privacy interests of educational institutions and chose not to extend privilege
for peer review documents.5 7 The Supreme Court did find it appropriate to create a
privilege for confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her
patient in Jaffee v. Redmond.58 Here, the Court found that Rule 501 rendered the
common law to be flexible and adaptable in varying conditions. 59 This flexibility
of the common law allowed the Court to recognize privilege based on a confiden-
tial relationship on a case-by-case basis.60 The Court applied a simpler version of
48. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
49. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
50. See generally IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45, § 5.4.3 IMPACT ON THE CRITERIA FOR SELECTING
THE RELATIONS TO BE CLOAKED WITH A PRIVILEGE.
51. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
52. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
53. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
54. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45. See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (Su-
preme Court found party would not divulge information to an attorney without attorney-client privi-
lege); Swinder & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399 (2002) (reaffirming Fisher, since information would not
be divulged without privilege the loss of evidence is "more apparent than real.").
55. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
56. Id. at 583.
57. Id. at 582.
58. See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
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the Wigmorean framework.6 1 The Court found that a "reasonableness standard"
could be applied in favor of protecting confidential communications in light of the
"sufficiently important interests" that "outweigh the need for probative evidence."
62 The Court found that justice would not be compromised by the recognition of a
psychotherapist/patient privilege.
B. Labor-Relations Privilege Law in Other Jurisdictions
In Cook Paint & Varnish Co.," the NLRB held that correspondence between
an employee and his union representative concerning a grievance matter was un-
discoverable by an employer in relation to a subsequent lawsuit. 65 There, an em-
ployee was terminated for his involvement in a paint-spilling incident that resulted
in the employee's own injury.6 6 On the day the employee was terminated, the
union filed a grievance on behalf of the employee invoking binding arbitration.6 7
Prior to the arbitration, the employee's union representative was called into the
General Superintendent's office and questioned about the grievance case he and
the employee were preparing.68 Additionally, the General Superintendent "or-
dered" the union representative to produce his notes of the employee's grievance
from his union notebook by the following day.6 9 The union representative was
threatened with disciplinary action should he fail to comply with investigation.o
The union representative answered questions under protest but refused to produce
any notes from his union notebook.7 '
The NLRB held that an employer may conduct a "legitimate investigatory in-
terview in preparation for a pending arbitration"; however, in this case, a reasona-
ble investigation did not extend to the meeting between the union representative
and the District Superintendent.7 2 The NLRB found that the District Superinten-
dent did not have a legitimate reason for conducting the investigation and that
acquiring the information sought would unreasonably interfere with the employ-
ee's rights.7 3 While the NLRB refused to recognize a "blanket rule"-one that
could have set a standard for all union and employee correspondences-the deci-
sion rendered officially recognized the need to protect certain activities in order to
allow candid communication between union representatives and employees for
matters involving potential or actual discipline. 74
In a similar decision, a New York court held that an employer committed an
improper employment practice by questioning a union officer in regards to "ad-
61. Id. at 9-10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 258 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1230, 1230 (1981).
65. Id.
66. Id.






73. Id. at 1231-32.
74. Id. at 1232.
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vice and assistance" he provided to a union employee facing disciplinary charg-
es.7 5 The court found that the failure to protect union and employee relations in
the instant case and under similar circumstances would deter union employees
from seeking advice and representation from the union.7 6 The court found a statu-
tory basis77 for providing union members privileges "on matter[s] where a mem-
ber has a right to be represented by a union representative, and then only where
the observations and communications are made in performance of a union duty."78
The boundaries of union and employee relationships were further tested in
Seelig v. Shepard." In Seelig, the mayor of New York sought to investigate an
alleged incident of the use of physical force in a prison.8 0 As part of the investiga-
tion of the incident and the events leading up to it, representatives of the city of
New York sought to discuss the incident with Seelig, President of the Correction
Officer's Union, by issuing him a subpoena. ' Seelig sought to quash the subpoe-
na, arguing that any information he possessed of the events in question was privi-
leged information due to his role as union president. 82 The court found Seelig's
argument to be invalid and that a union-relations privilege is not absolute and does
not protect communications between Seelig and non-union members, which in-
cludes upper-management at the Department of Correction. 83
Union-relations privileges have been further limited in other jurisdictions, as
demonstrated in the California case, American Airlines, Inc v. Superior Court.4
There, an employee was suing American Airlines for wrongful termination, har-
assment and discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
85(FEHA). A representative from the Local 564 of the Transport Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO (the Union) investigated the grievance on behalf of the
employee. When the union representative was questioned as to the details of the
employee's allegations, he claimed the information was privileged.8 7 American
argued that the union representative was a necessary witness and American would
be unable to construct a decent defense without any insight to the employee's
allegations.8 8 The court chose not to apply the narrow holding of Cook Paint,
finding that the facts of this case were not analogous. 89 The court held that the
questions did not "delve into the constitutionally protected right of associational
75. City of Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
76. Id at 675-77.
77. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §209-a(l)(a) ("It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or it
agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of such rights.").
78. City ofNewburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
79. Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1991).
80. Id. at 966.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 968.
84. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (Cal. App. 2003).
85. Id. at 148
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id at 155 (Does not inquire into prearbitration assistance the union representative gave the
employee and union employee does not face adverse job action).
No. 1] 203
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privacy," 90 and, therefore, there is no compelling reason for the court to judicially
create a new privilege.91
C. Privilege Law as Applied in Alaska
Similarly to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Alaska Rules of Evidence
state: "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or of
this state, by enactments of the Alaska Legislature, or by these or other rules
promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court, no person, organization, or entity has
a privilege . . . ."92 The Alaska Rules of Evidence list the following officially
statutorily recognized privileges: lawyer-client privilege,93 physician and psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, 94 husband-wife privileges,95 communications to cler-
gymen, 96 privilege of political vote,97 privileges to protect trade secrets,98 and
privileges to protect identity of informers. 99
As demonstrated in Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Alaska has a history ofju-
dicially-recognizing new privileges. 00 In this case, Alaska recognized a new
executive privilege for the Governor in the discharge of official duties by protect-
ing files "maintained by the Governor concerning potential appointees to state
office."10 The court found that the extension of privilege to internal memoranda
and "miscellaneous papers" in the appointment file was justified by public policy
considerations. 102 The court found that communications that contain advisory
opinions and recommendations should be afforded necessary protections in order
to encourage "candid opinions and debate among government officials during the
decision-making process."' 03
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Supreme Court of Alaska granted review of the superior court's order,
which found no basis for recognizing a union-relations privilege that would render
90. Id. at 157.
91. Id. at 158.
92. ALASKA R. EvID. 501: Privileges Recognized Only as Provided. Except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States or of this state, by enactments of the Alaska Legislature, or by
these or other rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court, no person, organization, or entity has a
privilege to:
(1) refuse to be a witness; or
(2) refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or
writing.
93. Id at 503.
94. Id. at 504.
95. Id. at 505.
96. Id. at 506.
97. Id. at 507.
98. Id. at 508.
99. Id. at 509.
100. Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617 (1986).
101. Id. at 618.
102. Id a 623-24.
103. Id. at 625.
204 [Vol. 2013
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Peterson's grievance file confidential.'0 The court concluded that Peterson's
grievance file was protected by the implied meaning of Alaska statutes, and the
court reversed the superior court's ruling and remanded the case for application of
the privilege to discovery proceedings. 05 As an appeal of a discovery ruling, the
standard of review applied by the court was abuse of discretion.106 Privilege is an
issue that must be determined independently of the overall proceeding and, as it
was purely a question of law, the issue was reviewed de novo."o0 The court stated
it would "adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, rea-
son, and policy." 08
The court first examined Alaska Evidence Rules to determine if there was an
evidentiary privilege already in place to protect Peterson's grievance file.' 0 9 Alt-
hough Alaska Evidence Rule 503 was the most relevant statute, the court deter-
mined that no existing privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, was broad
enough to extend to union representation. 0 The court reasoned that because a
union representative is neither a lawyer's representative nor an exclusive repre-
sentative of the employee, there was no existing privilege broad enough to en-
compass union representatives."'
Next, the court examined its authority to create new privileges in compliance
with Alaska Evidence Rule 501."12 The court examined other states with provi-
sions similar to Rule 501 and found that many states limit the recognition of privi-
leges "unless adopted by the legislature or a supreme court rule, or required by the
state or federal constitution."" 3  The court examined the history of the recogni-
tion of privileges in Alaska and found that the State had recognized an "executive
privilege for the governor in the discharge of official duties" in Doe v. Alaska
Superior Court.114 In Doe, the court examined the separation of powers principle
rooted in the Alaska Constitution, which allowed the court to create a limited ex-
ecutive privilege."'5 The court concluded that the basis for a valid union-relations
privilege would have to exist in statutes, the rules of the court, or the constitu-
tion.116
Next, the court looked at relevant case law to survey privileges adopted by
other jurisdictions." 7 The court examined Cook Paint, City of Newburgh, and
Seelig."' At the conclusion of the court's analysis, it considered creating a union-
relations privilege in Alaska based on the facts presented of the instant case.l19
104. Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 561 (Alaska 2012).
105. Id. at 560.





111. Id. at 562.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617, 626 (1986).
115. See generally id.
116. Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 562 (Alaska 2012).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 562-564.
119. Id. at 564.
No. 1] 205
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The State had argued that PERA does not create a unions-relations privilege,
drawing parallels between the instant case and American Airlines.120 The court
noted that the instant case is significantly different from American Airlines.121
First, unlike American Airlines, the instant case involved public employees cov-
ered by PERA.122 Second, the facts were limited to confidential correspondence
between an employee, his attorney and his union representative as it related to the
grievance process; American Airlines dealt with a broader scope of communica-
tions which extended to communications between a union representative and other
union employees.123 Finally, the communications at issue in American Airlines
contained facts and observations outside of the realm of confidential communica-
tions.124 For these reasons, the court rejected the State's argument to limit the
unions-relations privilege based on the holding in American Airlines.125
The court ultimately decided to recognize the existence of a union-relations
privilege, determining that such a privilege was implied in PERA where the stat-
ute states: "the enactment of positive legislation establishing guidelines for public
employment is the best way . . . to provide a rational method for dealing with
disputes and work stoppages." 26 The court found that PERA further recognized
the benefits. of collective bargaining, stating that a public employer "may not in-
terfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of employee rights . . .
or dominate or interfere with the formation, existence, or administration of an
organization." 27 The court then noted reasoning in Seelig that in order for a union
to function properly, there must be open communication that is free of undue in-
fluence and allows the union members to feel secure that the information they
divulge to representatives will not be "pried out of the representatives."' 28 The
court emphasized the importance of a privilege: to encourage union employees to
be forthcoming in grievance procedures and allow union representatives to better
advise and represent union employees.129 The court recognized a union-relations
privilege under PERA that extends to "communications made in confidence in
connection with representative services relating to anticipated or ongoing discipli-
nary or grievance proceedings between an employee (or the employee's attorney)
and union representatives acting in official representative capacity."' 30 The union-
relations privilege "may be asserted by an employee or the union of behalf of the
employee" and "only extends to communications, not underlying facts."' 3 ' The
court noted that the "expectation of confidentiality" was a crucial factor in deter-
mining the applicability of a privilege to a situation.132 The privilege does not go
so far to protect informal conversations and only applies to circumstances where
120. Id.
121. Id. at 566.




126. Id. at 564-565
127. Id. at 565.
128. Id.
129. Id
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the union representative is acting in his or her official union role. 3 3 The court
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.' 34
V. COMMENT
The Peterson holding will likely affect labor relations law in Alaska because
the decision ultimately strengthened the role of unions in grievance proceedings.
Further, the decision has the potential to affect the judicial discretion of courts in
other jurisdictions trying similar cases. The issue of the labor-relations privilege is
rarely tried, so courts in other jurisdictions will likely evaluate the Peterson hold-
ing in forming their own analysis.13 5 Finally, the court's reasoning may have a
macro effect on the creation of privileges in other jurisdictions, especially consid-
ering there is no universally recognized standard for privilege creation and courts
differ as to how and when they exercise discretion in privilege creation.
A. Exploring the Complex Nature of Union Relations
Before analyzing the effect of the Peterson holding on labor relations, it is
important to recognize that, unlike all other generally recognized privileges, the
labor-relations privilege has a broader scope. Unlike the attorney-client privi-
lege-where only the lawyer and client have interests in preserving a relationship
of confidentiality- the labor-relations privilege raises the issue of third party
interests.' 3 6 These third party interests encompass the interests of all other union
employee who rely on the union for employee organization.3 3 Also unique to the
interests at stake in a labor-relations privilege are that employees do not always
have the same interests and conflict between individual employee rights and col-
lective welfare of the union is inevitable.' 3 8 However, proponents of the labor-
relations privilege argue that internal conflicts favor the protection of "full and
frank" communication in order to serve the public interest.' 3 9 As the court in City
of Newburgh explained, allowing the overreaching questioning of a union repre-
sentative would not only affect the case of the employee currently seeking union
representation, but it would also further chill lawful union activity and potentially
seriously frustrate the union's ability to represent the needs of employees.1 40 Due
to the nature of the quasi-fiduciary relationship between a union and its members
and the effect that relationship has on the nature of collective bargaining, the un-
ion representative and employee must be able to "formulate their positions and
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Similar to the way the Peterson court looked to Cook Paint, City of Newburgh, Seelig, and
American Airlines.
136. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, A New York Court Recognizes a Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege, 9
LAB. LAW. 595, 599 (1993) [hereinafter Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege].
137. Id.
138. Id. "Unions, on a daily basis, often have to make difficult trade offs... between individual rights
and collective welfare." The article further discusses examples such as seniority disputes and affirma-
tive action.
139. Id. at 600.
140. City of Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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devise their strategies without fear of exposure., 14 As these authorities suggest,
the process of candid communications between one union representative and one
employee pertaining to a single case affects the infrastructure of the collective
bargaining system on which every other union employee relies.142
B. Peterson Holding Furthers Employee Interests
By understanding the complex nature of the collective bargaining relation-
ships and the scope of the interests at stake, it becomes understandable why the
court chose to expand its discretion to create a labor-relations privilege within the
means of the PERA statute. There is a strong public policy argument to recognize
a labor-relations privilege 43 and the Peterson court gave great weight to this ar-
gument.14 There are many reasons why lawyers do not and should not have a
"monopoly" in employment-related proceedings.' 45
Grievance proceedings often involve either small claims that do not justify
the cost of an attorney or employees that simply cannot afford to hire attorneys.14 6
It would seem unjust for these financial restraints to cost an employee an oppor-
tunity of adequate representation, because, absent a labor-relations privilege, any
communication with a lay representative could be subject to discovery.147 Rather
than penalize employees for using grievance procedures, the creation of a union-
relations privilege strengthens the collective bargaining infrastructures already in
place and ensures a more economical use of both parties' time and money. 148
Additionally, most grievance procedures in the employment setting apply various
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures.14 9 In order for these ADR proce-
dures to work effectively, employees must perceive the system to be fair.150 By
allowing an employer full-disclosure of an employee's communications during the
ADR stage of the grievance process, it is likely that employees will not view the
grievance procedure as fair, and the overall effectiveness of ADR in the work-
place may suffer as a consequence.
Further, society as a whole benefits when unions are free to function without
"harassment and interference."' 5 ' Open communication without undue interfer-
ence is central to the functioning of the union.' 52 It is crucial that employees who
rely on the union view the union representatives as their spokespersons and not
mere agents of their employer.' 53 As a result of the Peterson holding, unions in
Alaska will be strengthened because the court explicitly protected communica-
141. Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 241.
142. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 2.
143. Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 233.
144. Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 565 (Alaska 2012).
145. Labor Union Evidenliary Privilege, supra note 135, at 601.
146. Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 135, at 601.
147. Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 135, at 601.
148. See generally Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 130.
149. Corporate Counsel's Guide to Legal Aspects of Employee Handbooks and Policies, Empl.
Handbooks & Policies § 25:2 (Nov. 2012).
150. Id.
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tions made in confidence in connection with representative services relating to
anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings between an employ-
ee (or the employee's attorney) and union representatives acting in official repre-
sentative capacity. 154 Thus, in Alaska, industrial strife will be curtailed as a result
of the facilitation of labor-relations communications. 5 5
Additionally, the Peterson holding has the potential to affect the creation of a
labor-relations privilege in other jurisdictions. Just as the court in Peterson relied
on decisions in other jurisdictions to create their labor-relations privilege, 5 6 it is
possible that courts from other jurisdictions will apply the Peterson holding to
their holding analysis. The influence of prior analysis by other courts is evident in
the Peterson decision because the privilege does not extend to underlying facts of
a claim or informal conversations where the union representative is not acting in
their official role.1 57 This more narrow interpretation of a labor-relations privilege
considers the rationales of the courts in Seelig'5 8 and American Airlines,159-- two
cases in which courts held that there was no applicable labor-relations privileges
based on the facts of the case. Given that the Peterson court created an absolute
labor-relations privilege-one that takes into account positive and negative rulings
in favor of a labor-relations privilege in other jurisdictions-it is reasonable to
believe that the holding may influence other courts who consider the applicability
of a labor-relations privilege in their respective jurisdictions.
C. The Peterson Rationale: All Policy and No Balancing
The Peterson case indirectly raises broad issues related to privilege creation.
It is important to evaluate the court's rationalization in determining the existence
of an absolute privilege in order to ensure the court complied with standards of
privilege creation. As mentioned prior, Wigmore's four-pronged test created the
general standard for the recognition of new privileges. Wigmore's test bal-
anced the "benefit to society from encouraging a particular class of communica-
tion against the cost of impeding the fact-finding process."' 6 ' Though Wigmore's
theory fails to rectify the specific harm imposed on a litigant whose privilege
claim is denied, his approach adequately "focuses on extrinsic social policy and
the systematic effects of [a] privilege claim."l62 Wigmore required that privilege
beneficiaries who shared confidential communications be certain that a privilege
existed.'6 3 Although Wigmore's obvious intent was to curtail the creation of new
privileges, courts recognize the importance of protecting the loss of evidence. '
Thus, courts have been least reluctant to create privileges when the loss of evi-
154. Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 567 (Alaska 2012).
155. Labor Union Evidentiary Privilege, supra note 135, at 601.
156. Peterson, 280 P.3d at 567.
157. Id.
158. Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (1991).
159. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 155 (Cal. App. 2003).
160. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45.
161. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266.
162. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266.
163. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266.
164. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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dence is "more apparent than real."l65 However, Wigmore's requirement of cer-
tainty is too narrow of a test to protect all necessary confidential communications.
In an attempt to recognize privileges obstructed by Wigmore's rigid frame-
work, some courts and academics have adopted a humanistic model to determine
the applicability of a privilege.166 The humanistic model focuses on "whether the
other party to the relation is the sort of individual whom the person needs to con-
sult in order to make intelligent, independent life preference choices."' 6 7 Unlike
Wigmore, this model invites the court to consider public policy and create privi-
leges based on privacy justifications.168 This approach is more individualized to
encompass the facts of the case and does not focus on the effect of the privilege on
broader behavior.' 6 9
In understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each framework, it becomes
understandable why courts are reluctant to set one standard for privilege creation.
Courts should not pick one framework as a universal framework for identification
of all privileges, but rather choose which of the two models will render the most
appropriate form of a privilege, given the facts of the case. The humanistic model
is most effective in determining the application of a privilege in a particular judi-
cial proceeding on a case-by-case basis.o7 0 In contrast, Wigmore's balancing pro-
cess is a better framework for courts that aim to recognize "an absolute privilege
in all proceedings."' 7 '
In Peterson, the court failed to fully adopt the Wigmore framework in creat-
ing an absolute labor-relations privilege.' 72 Further, the court bases much of its
authority to create an absolute judicial privilege in the findings of other courts that
created fact-specific privileges made applicable to those immediate cases. While
the lack of precedence and the complexity of labor-relations interests suggest the
court may have struggled in reaching its decision, it seems clear that absolute
privileges should not be created until the court balances the loss of evidence with
the interest of facilitating communication. Although public policy arguments indi-
cate a Wigmorean analysis in other instances of privilege creation, that will likely
not be a key characterization in issues concerning the labor-relations privilege.
Irrelevant of which framework is used, courts should examine public policy
arguments in order to properly weigh the interests of the entire union. Policy justi-
fications alone are not compelling enough for an absolute privilege of any kind to
pass the muster of the Wigmore test. The key component of the Wigmore test
requires that the court balance evidentiary interests with policy interests. The Pe-
terson court's finding' 73 was based on public policy rationales, and the probative
165. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
166. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
167. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
168. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266-67.
169. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266-67.
170. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266-67.
171. Ricafort, supra note 35, at 266-67.
172. Peterson v. State, 280 P.3d 559, 567 (Alaska 2012). The court concluded that "the expectation of
confidentiality is critical to the privilege because without it 'union members would be hesitant to be
fully forthcoming with their representatives, detrimentally impacting a union representative's ability to
advise and represent union members with questions or problems."' Thus, the court rendered a decision
based on an expectation of confidentiality without weighing the probative value of the evidence lost.
173. Id. at 565. State's forced "disclosure of confidential communications between an employee and a
union representative during a grievance proceeding would constitute an unfair labor practice." Further,
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value of the evidence was never explored. The Peterson holding was supported by
the PERA statute and the court acted within its discretion in rendering its decision.
However, by omitting a balancing test in its creation of an absolute privilege, the
court failed to discretely rationalize its conclusion. Even in the presence of a
strong public policy argument, courts should also consider the rationale for pre-
serving candid communications in light of the court's interest in the facilitation of
the discovery of truth. This will help to ensure privileges do not become overly
utilized in a way that grossly obstructs the judicial system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Peterson decision effectively advances the interests of unions and em-
ployees by creating a privilege that protects confidential communications between
union representatives and employees made during the grievance procedure pro-
cess. In its holding, the court sets forth a clear rule that takes into consideration
many scenarios that both limit and broaden the rule based on case law in other
jurisdictions. The court's holding is consistent with the principles of labor-
relations law and the court properly identified PERA as the source of the privi-
lege. Further, the court's decision will preserve the equal footing necessary to
ensure ADR techniques are effective in the workplace. However, the rationale the
court used to reach its decision was solely based on discretion and public policy in
favor of creating the privilege. In creating new privileges, courts should consider
some form of a cost-benefit analysis in order to fully recognize the evidence that
the creation of the privilege will obstruct. Privileges should remain a rare excep-
tion and courts should continue to prove that the interest in loss of evidence is
outweighed by the interest in protecting the confidential communications.
JOANNA L. BYRNE
the court held "[b]ased on the strong interest in confidential union-related communications and the
statutory protection against unfair labor practices, we hold PERA impliedly provides the State's union
employees a union-relations privilege." Id.
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